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GERMAN CAPITALISM AND THE POSITION 
OF AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY BETWEEN 
THE TWO WORLD WARS (2) 
By Yuji NISHIMUTA* 
III "Socio-structural" Factors Surrounding Crisis of Automobile Industry in 
Germany 
I. Constraints to Growth of the Demand 
Table 9 shows population per an automobile for U.S.A., U.K., France and Germany 
10 1925, 1928 and 1932 respectively. This allows us to gain a broad idea of the stan-
dard of "motorization" in these countries at that time. Again, the United States 
maintain an overwhelming superiority, but what is significant is the fact that Germa-
ny's level was much lower even in comparison with U.K. and France. The inferiority 
remains basically unchanged in the peroid of rapid growth of output under the 
industrial rationalization movement (from 1928 to 1932). It is not unreasonahle, 
under these circumstances, to conclude that automobile market in Germany had a 
remarkable growth poten tial, and in fact, that was the expectation of owners of 
autOillobile companies. It was not so in reality, because of a number of constraints, 
of which the followings seem to be important. 
First, the National Railways (Reichsbahn), with its highly developed railway 
network, exerted monopolistic power in transportation of cargo and passenger in the 
country, and the Reich government strongly supported it by pursuing railway-cen-
tered transportation policy. This is partly due to the strategic importance of Ger-
man railway system throughout the Second Empire extending over Prusso-Austian 
Tab. 9 Population per an automobil in Major Countries 
year U.S.A. U.K. France Germany 
1925 6.8 50 74 244 
1928 5.2 :;8 44 194 
1932 4.8 30 25 100 
Wolfgang B. von Lengercke, Kraf!farzeug uad Staat, 1941, Heldelberg-
Berlin-Magdeburg, S. 76, 77. 
* AssociaLe Professor, Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University. 
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War, Prusso-French War and the First World War." Because of this unchallenged 
position, Reichsbahn was able to have several laws introduced in order to restrict 
automobile traffic to its Own advantage. This trend became even more pronounced 
after 1924 when the authority faced significant growth of automobile traffic, and the 
peak was reached with the introduction of Verordnung (administrative order) of 
October 6, 1931 which provided for (I) strict permission, (2) control on fares and 
(3) mandatory insurance policy concerning automobile transportation." 
Second, as the consequence of strong concentration of transportation-oriented 
public investment to railways, development of road allowing automobile traffic was 
inadequate. According to a survey on road in Germany of 1933,3) "while a road 
should have the minimum width of 5.5 m in order to satisfy ordinary needs of mo-
torized traffic", only 30% of the "Staate-und Provinzal Strassen" (national and dis-
trict road) considered as the first class road in Germany, had the width of 5.5 m or 
more. As to the lower class road called "Kreis-und Bezirksstrassen", 66.5% was 
narrower than 4.5 m. The survey concluded that 67% of German roads were "not 
suited" for modern automobile traffic because of their lack of width and adequate 
Automobil Tax 
GasoIin Tariff 
domestic Tax on fuel 
Total fuel Tax 
Tab. 10 a 
12.60 RM per 100ee 
}15.0o...RM a year per 2,500 ce 
16.23 pf. per a Lit. 
4.66 pf. per a Lit. 
20.89 pf. per a Lit. 
if 151/100 km, 2,000 km a year, 
627.00 RM a year 
-'------------------------------
.. Annual Tax per Automobil 942.00 RM 










W. Jacobi, a.a.O., S. 20. 
1) For the strategic importance of railways in Germany during the First \Vorld \Var, see 
A.J.P. Taylor, ~!The [First World War-an Illustrated History, Harmondsworth , 1966, 
translated by Minoru Kurata, "Daiichiji Sekai Taisen", p. lB. 
2) O. Ziegler, Shiene order Straf3e? Das moderne Verkehrspoblem in Deuschland, dell wichtigsteu 
eUTopaischen Staaten und USA, Prag 1934, S. 65. 91. 
3) W. Jacobi, Die Maf3nahmcn zur ForderulIg des Automobilabsatzes in Deutschland, 1541, S. 32. 
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pav ement,4.) 
Third, and as a more direct constraint, the taxation and tariff system of Reich 
government imposed heavy burden on ownership and use of automobile. The 
government held a traditional view that automobiles were a luxury item, and heavily 
taxed both automobiles and imported gasoline." Table 10 shows how this is trans-
lated into annual tax burden per an automobile. We can easily see that compared with 
tax burdens in other countries (U.S.A., France and U.K.), tax burden was exceptio-
nally high in Germany. 
Fourth, as it can be seen from the duty on gasoline already mentioned, Germany 
was at a relative disadvantage concerning oil supply. The United States have had 
rich petroleum resources at home, while U.K. and France had colonies producing 
abundant petroleum. Germany, on the contrary, was rich in coal mines but it had 
virtually no oil coming from domestic sources. This handicap led Germany to 
develop technologies such as conversion of 'coal- into"fuel oil,synthesi"Zedpetroleum, 
diesel engine and so forth. Nevertheless, disadvantage of having to depend entirely 
on imported oil was obvious, especially as consumption grew rapidly due to growth of 
automobile traffic, all the more because the country had to pay huge amount of war 
reparations under the Versailles Treaty and every effort was necessary to curb the 
import. 
Fifth, we must not overlook the fact that the traditional attitude to regard auto-
mobile as luxury was still very much alive among the people.6) 
These factors acted individually as well as COllectively as socio-structural obsta-
cles for growth of automobile demand in Germany at the time. 
If we go a step farther, yet, we realize that behind the Reich government's trans-
portation policy centered on railways and various administrative measures as we11 as 
intentions corresponding to it) there was a fundamental characteristic peculiar to 
German capitalism since the Second Empire and deeply influencing the country's 
industrial development. Specifically, coal and steel production was at the center of 
German industry, to which electrical machinery and chemical sectors were lined up 
as auxiliary elements, and all of them were in turn integrated by railway transporta-
4) In 1930, German Automobile Club (Allgemeinen Deutschen Automobil-Club) sent a 
petition to the government, requesting it to improve roads for convenience of motor 
traffic. VV. Jacobi, a.a.a., S. 32. 
5) This was part1y due to the fact that automobile Owners were a welcome target of the 
Weimar government who aimed redistribution of wealth by way of progressive taxation 
and other tnean~. 
6) W. Jacobi) a.a.a.) S. 17. An interesting argument arose in 1932 between Professor 
Sombart, an economist. and professor Oswald, a chemical expert. vVhile Sornhart argued 
that automobiles should be banned in order to protect environment and reduce noise 
level, (Oswald tstrongly argued in favor of automobile for their :technical anel practical 
value. Jacobi, a.a.a., S. 14. 
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tion into a complex system." 
This traditional structure of development of German capitalism was reflected in 
the Reich government's industrial policy. After the end of the First World War, 
various consequences of the Versailles Treaty and Weimar structure added further 
element of socio·structural constraints over growth of demand for automobiles in 
Germany. We may think that these factors prevented so-called "mass production 
system" or "the American model", introduced under the industrial rationalization 
movement, from achieving full development. For from the objective, huge amount 
of capital invested in fixed assets turned into a negative burden on the part of 
automobile industry who had no alternative than to face the serious crisis." 
These circumstances were obviously beyond the control of financial or industri-
al capacity proper to German automobile manufacturers. F. Ledermann, an eminent 
contemporary scholar of management science, aptly remarked that it was a "miscal-
culation in rationalization of German automobile industry" (Fehlrationalisierung-der 
irrweg der deutschen Automobilindustrie). 
2. "Structural Contradiction" of German Capitalism during the peroid of "Industrial 
Rationalization Movement" 
Yet, if we take a short look at the trends of other German industrial sectors as 
a part of the overall framework in the same pariod, there emerge certain factors 
not included in Ledermann's scope of vision. 
Various researches made in Japan concerning German capitalism between the 
two World Wars have shown that during the "industrial rationalization movement" 
period, other industrial sectors such as steel" and chemical lO ) experienced problems 
due to low plant utilization and deterioration of income, because new capital invest-
ment and diversification under the rationalization movement were not necessarily 
matched by growth of demand for products. For the purpose of the present study, 
7) Lenin, t!Shihonshugino Saikono Dankai toshiteno Teikokushugi" (Imperialism as the 
Highest Stage of Capitalism), Iwanami Bunko, Translated by Motosuke Udaka, p. 17. 
8) Mukai, Shikamatsu, "Sangyono Gorika" (Industrial Rationalization, 1930) is one of the 
reports on the rationalization movement in Germany, and the author cites automobile 
industry as an example or "technical success turned into a management failure". He 
wrote: "These German automobile companies built up fine conveyor systems and then 
removed them completely, only to adopt simple flow lines of work. This is because the 
conveyors are very adapted in a factory turning out several hundred cars per day, but 
not if the volume is 20 to 30 cars at most in one day. Thus, the work rationalization 
attempted by enthusiastic engineers appears to have railed in Germany, at least for the 
moment". p. 179. 
~J) For German steel industry of this pt:!riod, see Kudo, A., !!Tekko" (ibid.), and specially 
on deterioration of utilization rate (p. 93) and changes in shares of steel products to 
total output (p. 108). For instance, railroad-use materials, and wagons deCl'eased from 
2.7 million tons in 1913 (16.8% or the total) to I.f million tons in 1928 (11.-1%). The 
[Otal production also decreased from 16 million tons to 12.88 million tons during the 
same period of time (Table 7). 
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Fig . .5 Development of Railway Network in Germany (including Colony) 
we may not need to take a detailed look on this aspect, but these findings are suffi-
cient to suggest us that the development of various industrial sectors under the 
traditional growth structure of German capitalism had struck a certain limit at that 
time. As Figure 5 shows, German railway network continued a constant growth ever 
since the advent of the Second Empire until the end of the first world war, and at the 
period of rationalization movement the opposite trend starts to develop. In the 
author's opinion, this change is significant. 
In any event, industrial policies followed by the Reich government as an exten-
sion of the growth structure of German capitalism since the advent of the Second 
Empire acted on one part as the restraint to the growth of automobile industry, 
while on the other hand growth of other industrial sectors came to a stagnance under 
the same policies. Moreover, growth of production capacity realized under the indus-
trial rationalization movement acutally had an aggravating effect on the "structural 
10) For chemical industry, see Kocio, ibid., "IG Farben nO Seintsuto Tenkai". During thili 
epach, l.G. Farben concentrated investment to development of new business. Examples 
are Hoechst (acetilene and synthetic acetic acid-solvent), Beyer (synthetic rubber and 
point) and Reuna (Iiquidication of coal for production of artificial petroleum). Never-
theless, in 1920's, "there was practically no market for these products" (p.IIO). Clearly, 
IG Farben was trying to become a major factor in automobile industry, but the strategy 
was frustrated due to the crisis of automobile industry as referred to already. 
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contradiction" rather than to resolve it. The whole problem for German capitalism 
during the period of "industrial rationalization movement" was there. It is well 
known that rate of unemployment, although quite different in character from that in 
existence prior to the First World War, persisted during the rationalization periodlll 
-- the ratio was normally 2~3% from 1900 to 1913 except for depression cycles in 
which it rose to 7 to 8%, but the ratio was consistently above 10% from 1924 to 1928. 
This means that German capitalism at that time was generally in a recession, in spite 
of a short period of "Inventions-konjonktur" (investment boom) .12) 
The worldwide panic that started at New York Stock Exchange on October 24, 
1929 was a severe blow to the capitalism irl Germany, already struggling hard with 
the structural difficulty. Unemployment hit a critical record level of six million 
people in 1932, while the failure of Danato Bank and merger of Deutsche Bank and 
Diskonto Gesselschaft triggered a drastic reoganization of financial department. In 
such an environment, the major German banks. or the German financial capital, 
being the unchallenged leader of total industrial structure including all traditionally 
important sectors like coal & steel, electrical machinery and chemicals as well as auto-
mobile industry, were hard pressed to achieve some fundamental restructuring of the 
industrial base. The coming into power of Nazi happened at the very moment of 
such challenge, on January 30, 1933. 
IV Development of the "Motorisierung" Policy Under the Nazi Government 
l. "Motorisierung Politik" 
Twelve days after seizing the power, at the Berlin Automobile Show (Berliner 
Automobilausstellung) which opened on February 11,1933. Hitler made the following 
statement: "The astonishing developmant of railroad in 19th Century realized a reVO-
lution of traffic, but its complexity was such that individuals were deprived of free 
dam of transportation. It is now that we need to build automobiles as the trans-
portation means of the new age, readily available for satisfaction of plans and inten-
tions of individual persons, as well as roads to be used by automobiles, SO that we 
are able to secure freedom of traffic" ,13) 
Hilter thus declared itnplementation of comprehensive "motorisierung"14) plan by 
the Nazi government, and thereafter, various policies for promotion of automobiJe 
industry were introduced one after another. We have already seen the dismal con-
ditions of German automobile industry and the country's capitalism immediately pre-
II) Tsukamoto, ibid., "Nazis Keizai", p.94. and Kato, ibid., "\VI-'imar Taiseino Keizai Kozo", 
pp. 210-211. 
12) The basic problem, of course, is how to understand the issue. 
13) Reichsverband der Automobilindustrie, -t- Reden zur Erotfnung der International Auto-
mobilausstellung, Berlin 1933. Iwasaki, MatSllyoshi, "Jidosha Kogyono Kakuritsu" (The 
Establishment of Automobile Industry l. 1941, p. 236. 
J.1) German equivalent of Ilmotorization", used here for the sake of its special implications. 
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ceding Nazi's seIzure of power, and given the fact, it is not surprising at all that the 
new Regime opted for the policies already mentioned. We shall see later how these 
policies were implemented and what results were obtained. In the meantime, it is 
necessary to turn our attention to another significant aspect of Hitler's ideas concer-
ning automobiles. This consists of the so-called "Heeresmotorisierung" (military mO-
torization) plan which started to take form after the capitulation within the German 
Defence Forces.''' A pamphlet titlecl "Heeresmotorisierung" (Berlin, 1931) authored 
by W. Nehling, an officer of the German Army, contains those characteristic state-
ments: 
"It IS too costly to stock a vast number of automobiles for military purpose. 
Moreover, by the time a war breaks out actually, these automobile may have already 
obsolescent and incapable to show performances comparable to those of enemy vehi-
cles. On top of this, the military will need a very large number of drivers (the author's 
underline), and it will be irnpossible to have access--t6 sufficient number of drivers 
unless automobiles are widely used already in peace time······ Therefore, all respon-
sible people must try to do their best not only to maintain German automobile 
industry at a high level of standard, but also to promote the industry so that it 
could achieve the highest possible degree of prosperity. Our country's future depends 
on our success in this regard······ Such a strong support to our automobile industry 
is necessary because Heeresmotorisierung must be able to take full advantage from 
the automobile industry and "vVirtschaftsmotorisierung", that is to say, using Inajor 
part of automobiles and production capacity already in existence in the ecnomic life 
for the military purpose when necessary.16)" 
This concept "vas clearly the other side of the "Motorisierung" coin. ,Ye- are now 
going to see how this strategy was implemented in Germany. 
First, it took the form of abolishing of automobile tax. The law concerning 
amendment to the taxation on automobile dated April 10, 1933 stipulates in Article 
2a as follows: "Those passenger vehicles, passenger motorcycles and all types of 
omnibus driven by internal combustion engines for which permission has been gran 
ted on and after March 31,1933 are exempt from aU taxes"l7l (the author's underline). 
Following this, the taxes were exempted for all second-hand automobiles under 
the law of May 31, 1933. The laws had an effect of reducing maintenance cost of 
automobiles immediately by ten to fifteen percent.!8) 
Second, it took massive efforts to improve as well as expand automobile road 
systeln. The "Generalinspektors fur des deutsche Strassenwesen19 )" (German Road 
15) P. Kirchberg, Entwicklungslendcnzen der deutschen h-raftfahrzeugindustrie 1929-1939) ge:;cigt am 
Beispiel der Auto Union Ag, Chemnitz Diss. Dresden, 1964, S. 90. 
16) v\T. Nehring, Heersmotorisicrung, Berlin 1931, S. 35 Zitiert bei P Kirchberg. 
17) P. Kirchberg, a.a. O.S. 93 ff. 
18) W. Jacobi, a.a. 0., S. 23. 
18) R.J. Overy, op. cil., p. 474. 
19) \V. Jacobi, a.a. 0., s. 32. 
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Supervisory Agency) was created in 1933 in order to consolidate all road-related 
administrative actions, heretofore decided among various agencies, into a single 
administrative body, in order to allow it to undertake large scale upgrading and 
construction of automobile-use road network. The most important part of these 
efforts is the plan announced on May, I, 1933 for construction of a total 7,000 km of 
"Autobahn". It was implemented immediately under the "Law concerning Constru~­
tion of Reichsautobahn"20l dated June 27: 
"Article I. The Deutsche Reichsbahn (Stale Railways) Company is hereby au-
thorized to undertake construction and maintenance of automobile routes in 
addition to its existing lines of business. A company shall be founded for this 
purpose, to be called Deutsche Reichsautobahn Company. 
Article 9. Deutsche Reichsautobahn Company shall be empowered to make 
requistions of land for public use in conjunction with conduct of its business. 
Article 12. The Reichsgovernment shall be authorized to issue administrative 
orders necessary for application of the Law. 
Under the law, construction of Frankfurt AIM - Mannheim Route was started 
already on September 23 of the same year, and works progressed at a fast pitch 
elsewhere. In May, 1935, the first section was completed between Frankfurt-am-Main 
and Darmstadt, and by December, 1938, the Autobahn covered a total distance of 
3,000 km.2Il 
Tab. 11 Participant of Berlin Motor Show 
year Visitor area (Ten thausand) (m2) 
---_._--_. 
1931 29.5 16.0 
1932 
1933 35,0 16.0 
1934 'f!. (J 19.0 
1935 59,0 45.0 
1936 64.0 45.0 
1937 73.0 45.0 
1938 77.0 50.0 
1939 82.5 35.0 
H.C.G.v. Sehherr-Thoss, a.a.() .• S. 640, 641. 











20) F. Volk, Der Aufbau der Gesselschaft "Reichsautobahnen"~ Diss. Leipzig, 1935, s. 5, 
Iwasaki, ibid., p. 242. 
21) Iwasaki, ibid .. p. 244. 
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Third, Reichsbahn newly created a trucking transportation division and placed order 
for a large number of trucks.") Historically, Reichsbahn had been against promo-
tion of any automobile traffic, but the establishment of Reichsautobahn Company as 
a subsidiary nOw harmonized the vested interest with the need to promote automobile 
transportation 
Fourth, the fact that the Berlin Motor Show was utilized as an opportunity for 
big scale promotional activity seems to be worthy of our attention. Ever since ib 
start in 1897, the show had been sponsored by the Federation of German Automobile 
Industry (R.d.A.), but the Nazi government now became the real promotor and 
sponsor. Table II shows number of visitors to the Berlin Motor Show from 1931 to 
1939. It will be seen that number of visitors snowballed from 350,000 in 1933 to 
4lO,000, 590,000, 640,000, 730,000, 770,000 and to 830,000 year after year. We might 
say that U.S. style "mass marketing", a condition essential for development of mass 
production, was now being undertaken not hy the manufacturers.huthy the State 
itself.'3) 
It was precisely at this juncture that Hitler made these public addresses as 
already mentioned. They were a unique fusion of promotion of automobile and 
propaganda for Nazi ideology. The U.S. style turnaround of concept of automobile 
triggered by Henry Ford repeated itself in Germany at Hitler's initiative. This pub-
lic address quoted in the beginning of this section is a typical example showing 
key characteristics of so-called "ideology of Germanic democracy"'" in which "the 
aspirations for a strong individual" as a necessary outcome of bourgeois individualism 
is transformed in a voluntary obeisance to the strong. The ultimate objective of 
Nazism was to take advantage of this shift of consciousness of German people at 
large in order to ensure their obeisance to Hitler, their voluntary participation to 
the movement for reconstruction of German Empire, as the obedient "drivers" of the 
22) O. Ziegler, a.a.O., S. JOO. 
23) Strategies used by German automobile industrty prior to this event (February, 1933) for 
promotion of "mass marketing" is not well known enough. This is one of future tasks 
for the author. 
24) ~~Decision taken by the majority votes, the principle of parliamentalism) is denial of the 
rights of individual by attaching priority to interest of the mass from time to time, and 
thus, it violates the natural and fundamental ideals of aristocratic principles". ,. ..... "The 
Judaic doctrine transformed in Marxism refuses the natural aristocratic principles. 
Instead of the exernal prerogatives of power and strength, it respects the mass and its 
vain weight. Marxism thus denies the value of individuals as a human being, objects 
to the significance of nations and races, and deprives humanity of the bases of its 
existence and its culture" ....... "What is necessary is the true Germanic democracy. 
There is no such thing as the supremacy of majority over individual issues. Only if 
one decides to devote his capability and his life [or the sake of his own decision, the 
the decision is complete as the real will". A. Hitler, "Mein Kampf", 1925, translated by 
Hirano and Masazumi, Kadokawa Bunko, "\Vaga Toso" (Mein Kampf), Vo1. 1, p. 126 
et seq. 
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vehicle. 
The well-known "Volkswagen-program" was the culmination of this pOlicy. At 
the Berlin Motor Show of 1934, Hitler spoke to the public as follows: 
"As long as automobiles are the exclusive prerogative of the privileged class as 
a means of transportation, they create a bitter feeling among people who are 
more brave, 
the access to 
more industrious and mor~ capable, because they are not allowed 
use of automobiles. Today, automobiles should no longer be for 
exclusive use by the privileged class, but they must become the source of great enjoy-
ment and happiness of people on sundays and on holidays."'5) 
He therefore ordered Ferdinand Persche, an "engineering genius", to design 
Volkswagen which should be "economical, easy to drive, capable of showing good per-
formance even on inferior road, and having superior fuel efficiency". Following a 
number of complicated processes.") Adam Opel was eliminated in the meantime. In 
1937, VW Preparatory Company was organized under the control of Daimler-Benz 
and Deutsche Bank27) as the principal undertaking of German Labors Front (DAF). 
Construction of the main plant started at Fahrersleven near Wolfsbur." in the middle 
part of Germany. The Volkswagen design was completed in the next year, and it 
took the name of KDF Wagen in commemoration of Kraft durch Freude, the Nazi 
recreational organization. 
These policies were obviously part of the systematic strategy of "Motorisierung". 
Insofar as transportation was concerned, this meant a complete turnaround28) of the 
conventional policy of German Reich. It resulted in a complete dismantling of 
"social and structural" constraints over German automobile industry, and above all, 
over the demand for automobiles.29) As such. it exerted a drastic influence on the 
automobile market and production in Germany. From now on, we are going to see 
what was the direct effects of the .new.policy. 
2. Direct Effect and Significance of the Policy 
Coming back once again to Figure I, we notice that production of automobile 
10 Germany grew in leaps and bounds from 100,000 in 1933 to 170,000 in the follow-
ing year, far above the level of production in 1928, ancl then to 240,000 in 1935, 
300,000 in 1936, and to 340,000 in 1938. Volume of production thus grew three times 
within a relatively short span of six years. Now, we know how such a surprising 
growth was made possible. Simply stated, the advanced production system (patterned 
25) Iwasaki, ibid., p. 246. 
26) Furukawa. ibid" "Seiritsu Karei", and H. Handke, Zur Rolle der Yolk:;wagenpU1ne bei 
der Faschistischen Kriegsvorbereitung, Jahrbuch fUr 'Virtschnftsg~schichte, 1962-1. 
27) H. Handke, a.a.O., S. 45, 46, 68. 
28) To review overall policias adopted by the Nazi governmengen order to evaluate impor-
tance of the "motorisierung" will be a meaningful research on its own sight. 
29) Only ex(.eption was the duty on imported gasoline. This was to have a significant meaning 
later on. 
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after the U.S. model) introduced during the industrial rationalization movement was 
combined with the "Motorisierung" policy adopted by the Nazi government, with the 
result that the automobile industry was cut loose from the previous constraints in 
order to start a full-fledged development. Mass production system in the automobil 
industry was thus established for the first time in Germany.'" 
As the system of streamlined flow of work became operational, the "totalitarian 
right of command on labor" on the part of the capital started to function effectively 
over a large number of workers being absorbed by German automobile industry. 
The "top-staff-line" type of system of command could be understood as the infastruc-
ture needed to realize so-called "Fuhrerprinzip" (leadership principle) of Nazism in 
the domain of production process. 
This capital's "despotic right of command on the labor" was further strengthened 
and became complete as the result of dissolution by force of existing labor unions 
soon after the "government-sponsored" may day in 1933, their reintegration by DAF, 
introduction of unilateral determination of working conditions by the Labor Admin-
nistrator (Treuhander der Arbeit). enactment of the "Law concerning National La-
bor Orders" of January 10, 1934, use of "labor identity card" for authoritarian place-
ment of workers and other means. 
By the second half of 1930's, German automobile industry grew in scale compa-
rable to coal steel production. electrical machinery and chemicals and became a 
major sector of industry (ref. Table I a and b). Of even more importance, however, 
is the fact that because of the spectacular growth of automobile industry, these other 
traditional sectors quickly expanded their automobile-related business (e.g. thin plate 
in steel industry, synthesized rubber and petroleum, paints, solvents and the like in 
chemical industry), to such an extent that the old industrial structure built along the 
coal-steel-railway axis was now reorganized into one which nlight be called "industrial 
mass-production system built around the autolllobile industry."3!) It was through 
this process that the capitalislTI in Gennany succeeded in creating enough new jobs 
for unemployed and in putting an end to the serious recession.32) 
3. Crisis of Balance of Payment and the Second 4-Year Plan 
Behind the rapid recovery, the German capitalism was faced with a serious problem. 
Recovery of the economy caused a sharp increase in import of raw materials, espe-
cially such like petroleum and rubber because of the shift in the country's industrial 
structure as discussed earlier. Rumania and U.S.S.R. were particularly important 
30) Table 13 shows various management performance indexes of German automobile 
companies during the period of 1932 to 1935. 
31) More detailed analysis of the "structural transformation" will be an object of a separate 
study to be undertaken in a separate paper. 
32) Production index of German industry (1929=100) was 60.7 in 1933, 94.0 in 1935, and 117.2 
In 1937. Rate of unemployment was 26.3% in 1933, 11.6% in 1935 and 5.1% in 1937 
Tsukamoto, ibid., p. 19i 
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Tab. 12 German Oil import (1934-1938) 
I I year Fuel and i crud oil and etc labricating Oil I tar 
1934 128.4 15.4 6.3 
1936 169.2 24.6 1.8 
1938 224.8 43.4 1.4 
W. Cron, WiTtschafl im Europaischen Raum, 1940. 













as the source of petroleum import. (Table 12) 
This resulted in a serious crisis in Germany's international balance of payments, 
which triggered heated arguments concerning priorities of economic policies and 
speed at which such policies were implemented, while on the other hand it led to a 
strong demand for so-called Grossraumwirtschaft (wide economic zone) .33) 
Hitler's "Second 4-Year Plan"") was introduced at this very juncture. It consis-
ted, in the first place, to subsidize heavily large scale production of synthetic rubber 
and petroleum to replace import, for which total mobillization of German chemical 
industry was necessary. Secondly, it aimed to build up a powerful military strength 
on the basis of the country's automobile industry (and especially on the basis of pro-
duction of internal combustion engines) essential to develOp large scale "armored 
corps", "motorized infantry units" and the air force. This amounted to no less than 
full realization of the "Heeresmotorisiorung" (military motorization) .35) 
33) W. Croll, Wirtschaft im Europaischen Raum, 1940. Japanese Translation, "Yoroppa 
Chiikini Okeru Keizai", H. Uhrmacher, Grossraumwirtschaft, 1938, Japanese translation, 
"Koiki Keizai", by Sekai Keizai Chosakai, ed., the "Nazis Koiki Keizairon", 1943. 
34) On 0, ibid., t<Yonkanen Keikakuto Keizai Seisakuno Tenkan - Nazi Regime Kenkyu Note" 
(Economic Policy under the 4-year Plan-Some notes on the Nazi Regime), p. 183 et 
seq., in particular p. 192. 
35) The "Heeresmotorisierung" WaS commonly translated in Japanese as "Gun kikaika" 
(mechanization of armed fOl'"ces). For direct relationship between the aircraft industry 
and automobile industry in Germany, see Tsuji, Takezo, "Doitsuno Kokukogyo" (Aircraft 
Industry in Germany) in 1943, pp. 102-103. Vlith regard to specific types of aircraft and 
engine, the relationships were as follows: Messerschumit fighter MelO9 F2-Daimler - Benz 
DB60l, Twine engine Fokkewulf fighter FW 187-Daimler - Benz D8601, Junkers Bomber 
Ju 87-A - jumo 210, Dornier bomber Do 217 E - BMW 801. 
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Tab. 13 Major German Automobil firms (1932-1935) 
1932 1933 1934 1935 
Opel 
(Milli RM) i Sales 60 90 168-184 210-230 
output 21,581 35,599 68,204 102, 759 
workers 6,600 13,000 18,000 18,300 
Gross Income 25.94 47,73 82.60 112.82 (Milli RM) i 
Net Income ( 1'/ ) I -0.84 5.01 13.40 19. 76 
dividend (%) ! 0 0 0 0 
Daimler-Benz 
Sales 65 100 147 226 
workers 8, 700 14,000 22,600 26,600 
Gross Income 31. 22 49,34 82.24 111.10 
Net Income -4.95 2.47 4. 13 3.22 
Dividend (%) 0 0 0 5 
Auto Union 
Sales 40 65 116 181 
vVorkers 4,359 7,371 12,256 16,500 
Gross Income 19.01 28.45 49. 75 77.38 
Net Income -0.57 0.86 0.91 1.60 
dividend (%) 0 0 4 6 
Adler Werke 
Sales 30. 75 47.75 64.20 83.30 
Output 4,773 7,476 10,249 18.233 
Gross Income 11. 38 21. 00 29.98 138.38 
Net Income -5,02 II.l 1. 57 1. 42 
Dividend C%) 0 0 0 4 
Frankfurter Zeitung 30.8,1936. H. Priester, Das Deutsche Wirtschafswunder, 1936. 
As an example of the government's direct intervention to automobile industry, 
"Generalbevollmachtigte fUr das Kraftfahrwesen" (Executive Chairman for Automo-
bil Trafic) was appointed in 1938 at the instigation of Gahring with a view to enforce 
additional standardization (i.e., reduction of number of models) of automobile pro-
duction. In consequenece, number of models of passenger automobiles was reduced 
from 52 to 30 and that of trucks from 133 to 21. Construction work of mass 
production plant for manufacture of Volkswagen was accelerated in accordance with 
the policy.3S) 
36) P. Kerchberg, a.a. O. S. 194, Typisierung in cler deutschen Kraftfahrzeugindustrie und 
Generalbevollmachtigte fur das Kraftfahrwesen, Jahrbuch. fur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 10-1969 
II teil, S. 136. 
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In the meantime, attempts for creation of "wide economic zone" got momentum. 
Germany annexed Austria in 1938, and in March, 1939, Czechoslovakia became a 
German Protectorate, while a five-year treaty for economic cooperation was conclu 
ded with Rumania.") In the same year of 1939, on September 1, the German Ar-
mored Units invaded Poland, marking the start of the Second World War. 
Conclusion 
Our preceding analysis of German automobile industry suggest us a conclusion 
which may be expressed in the following terms: the management crisis of German 
automobile industry and the "structural contradictions" in German capitalism which 
became apparent during the period of "industrial rationalization movement" under 
the Weimar Structure, followed by the advent of Nazism, gave rise. to the "motor i-
sierung" policies under the new regime. It had an effect of not only freeing German 
automobile industry from a number of existing constraints, but turned these const-
raints themselves into a leverage to realize a fundamental transformation of industrial" 
structure of the German capitalism itself. The previous structure under [he 
Second Empire, coal and steel production integrated by railway transportation, was 
reorganized into a huge modern complex in which steel production, chemical industry 
construction of high ways and petroleum were built around the automobile mass 
production system. The structural conversion was of such character that Germany 
had no alternative but to seek construction of the "wide economic zone" as a Inatter 
of essential necessity. At the same time, the restructurization was a process in 
which a vast number of unemployed workers were reintegrated into the industry by 
the State, and in which the State achieved accomplishment of a unique form of mili-
tarization of economy called "Heeresmotorisierung", Capitalistic despotic right of 
. command within manufacturing plant was thus extended over the entire society. 
Throughout the process, the three crises inherent in the German capitalism fol-
lowing the First World War - the right of command in production process, interna-
tional competitive strength, and imperialistic independence - were resolved accor-
ding to the principles of Nazism. The crucial role of German automobile industry 
and its characteristic based on the "American Model" which emerged from the process 
seems to show us an important insight into the essence of Nazism, in that the role 
played by a rapidly developing new industry in the evolution and development of 
Nazism is probably the very essence of Nazism. 
37) W. Croll, a.a.a., Japanese translation, p. 238. German-Rumanian Joint Petroleum 
Company was established on this basis. 
